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Market and Financial Stability Research Division
The sustained growth in corporate debt over the past decade has led to an increasingly widespread
use of contingency clauses. These clauses, also known as “triggers”, are written into bond issue
contracts or bank loan agreements, and aim to facilitate borrowers’ access to financing by offering a
certain degree of protection to creditors. They result in a tightening of the company’s borrowing
conditions (for example an increment in the coupon or an early repayment), should its financial
situation deteriorate.
These clauses may have significant effects on the functioning of financial markets. First, because
they complicate both credit risk analysis and the valuation process of debt securities with such
triggers embedded. Second, because they complicate credit rating agencies’ task of rating debt-security
issuers. And lastly, because their triggering could result in the opposite effect to that sought, that is
to say, instead of protecting the creditor, they may cause a sharp deterioration in the borrower’s
financial position. At the same time, they may also result in a series of destabilising effects for
financial markets, exacerbated by the fact that investors are often unaware of their existence.
While these clauses must be used with caution by borrowers, adequate transparency is also essential
so that rating agencies, analysts and investors might fully understand their potential effects .
T
he development of new debt financing
products, associated with companies’
increased use of debt financing, especially in
new technology sectors, has been a particularly
salient feature in the debt financing market over the
past decade. The conditions of bank loans and the
characteristics of corporate debt securities have
become more complex due to the inclusion of
contingency clauses aimed at protecting creditors
and facilitating borrowers’ access to new sources of
financing, without too substantial an increase in the
cost of borrowing, at least in the short term. Many
of these clauses index interest rates or the repayment
of the principal to changes in a company’s rating.
Therefore, if a rating is downgraded to below a level
specified in the contract this will lead to, for example,
a rise in the cost of borrowing, the closing of a credit
line or an early repayment, and consequently to a
tightening of the company’s borrowing conditions.
The development of these contingency clauses
represents a new element for credit market
participants. It is particularly important to closely
assess the impact of these triggers on the analysis of
borrowers’ credit risk. While credit spreads do
generally provide a reasonably good measurement
of the risk of default or of the probability of an issuer’s
credit rating being downgraded (see article “How104 FSR • The development of contingency clauses • November 2002
The term “contingency clause” is taken to mean all
conditions in bond issue contracts or bank loan
agreements, whose triggering, tripped by the
occurrence of a predetermined credit event, brings
about a substantial change in the initially-agreed
financing conditions.
1|1 Why are such clauses used?
An increasingly widespread use
A sharp increase in this type of clause has been
observed over the past few years. This is part of a
broader trend of an increasing diversification of
financing tools made possible by advances in financial
engineering and the use of sophisticated credit risk
modelling tools.
In a period in which companies’ borrowing
requirements rose dramatically — especially in the
Telecommunication, Media and Technology (TMT)
sectors, due to the scale of fixed capital investments
and external growth operations — the use of these
complex financing techniques satisfied the needs of
borrowers, lenders and investors. It allowed borrowers
to diversify their sources of financing, — with an
increase in investment instruments fostering a
broader investor base — and the possibility of limiting
the immediate cost of their debt. And it provided
1| Overview of contingency clauses: how they work
and the different types of mechanisms
lenders with a tool for managing credit risks and a
more dynamic means of allocating lendable funds.
These types of clauses can also be seen as an
additional bargaining instrument available to lenders,
in particular credit institutions, which can be used in
their commercial relations with companies.
How contingency clauses work:
the example of callable or puttable bonds
On the euro bond markets, the outstanding amount
of callable and puttable bonds has more than doubled
over the past two years. In spring 2002, using data
published by Bondware, these bond outstandings were
estimated at over EUR 40 billion. Bonds redeemable
before maturity are defined as “callable” or “puttable”
on the basis of whether they are redeemed upon the
decision of the issuer or the investor 1.
– A callable bond, redeemable before maturity by
the issuer, enables the issuer to manage the cost
of its debt by allowing it to take advantage of an
interest rate cut and/or a narrowing of its credit
spread in order to buy back its bonds under
pre-specified conditions, and possibly issue new
ones under more favourable conditions  2. The
advantage for the investor is that the coupon paid
is higher than that of a standard bond, reflecting
the value of the option exercisable by the issuer.
much credit should be given to credit spreads?” in
this Financial Stability Review), the new clauses,
characterised by the inclusion of options in the
repayment conditions or the fixing of interest rates,
change matters considerably as they make this form
of risk measurement more complex and delicate.
On the one hand, investors often do not know that
they exist, particularly when they are written into
bank loan agreements, and on the other hand, while
analysis techniques do exist for assessing the impact
of these clauses, particularly those embedded in
financial instruments, it remains difficult to
accurately determine their effects on the borrowing
company. When these clauses are triggered in the
investor’s favour, they may result, for the issuer, in
a liquidity strain or an increase in the financial
burden, and thus, ceteris paribus, in a weakening of
the firm’s cash position and financial structure.
These triggers may backfire on the creditors who
initially sought to be protected by them. More
generally, their increasingly widespread use (1)
raises a number of questions, as it appears not only
to complicate credit risk analysis (2), but it is also
liable, particularly without sufficient transparency
regarding their use, to destabilise the dynamics of
the financial markets (3).
1 Bonds convertible into equity, which sometimes carry a call option, and sinkable bonds, redeemable in accordance with a payment schedule
starting before the nominal maturity date, are not dealt with in this article.
2 Callable bonds are particularly well suited to financial institutions offering property loans whose outstandings may decline rapidly due to the
possibility of early redemption in the event of interest rate cuts. The inclusion of a call option in the bond issued allows these institutions to more
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– Puttable bonds, redeemable before maturity by
the investor, make up less than 2% of the bonds
carrying options issued in Europe. However, such
options are also written into numerous bank loan
agreements. Puttable bonds are intended to make
it easier to place bonds of issuers whose credit
risk is considered to be significant, by offering
investors the chance to free themselves of their
debt obligation before the instrument matures,
in the event of the issuer’s credit quality
diminishing. They therefore allow investors to
better manage credit risk and more accurately
assess the minimum expected return on their
investments. Naturally, in return for this
flexibility, the coupon paid is lower than that of a
standard bond — in this case the investor
purchases a put option — and therefore, for the
issuer, the cost of debt is lower than it would be
for issuing a “standard” bond.
1|2 Different types of mechanisms:
a closer monitoring
of the soundness of the issuer
The specific feature of puttable or callable bonds is
that they carry an explicit option that can be
exercised at a price and according to a schedule
agreed at the time of issuance, i.e. at the issue
anniversary date after a certain number of years, or
even sometimes at any time after a given date. The
likelihood of these options being exercised will
therefore depend on two factors: the general level of
interest rates, and the issuer’s borrowing conditions,
determined by its credit risk. An issuer will only
exercise an option to buy back its bond if the level of
interest rates imposed on it by the market allows it
to reissue the bond under more favourable
conditions, i.e. if market rates have fallen and/or if
the risk premium, imposed by the market, has
declined. Conversely, an investor might exercise a
put option not only if the issuer’s credit rating is
lowered, but also if market conditions reflect an
overall upward pressure on yields, regardless of the
issuer’s situation.
Different option triggers
More recently, new types of debt instruments
carrying contingency clauses have been developed
to enable investors to manage their credit risk
exposure more closely and limit the impact of
changes in general market conditions. These
contingency clauses also carry an option component
that is not triggered by changes in the market value
of the instrument, but tripped “upstream” by other
triggers based on issuer-specific credit risk indicators.
In particular, for both bonds and bank loans, clauses
have been developed based on changes in the rating
awarded to corporate issuers by international rating
agencies and on changes in certain financial ratios
such as EBITDA/net debt.
Possible impacts: ranging from an increase
in the coupon to a break in financing
As the conditions triggering contingency clauses
have diversified, their consequences also become
more wide-ranging. We can broadly distinguish three
types of clause, depending on the impact of their
triggering on the initial financing conditions.
Specific security requirements
These types of clauses may be written into bank loan
agreements. They are based on techniques used
increasingly on financial markets in repo or swap
agreements for example or in payment systems for
securing intra-day loans. However, they differ in that
they constitute transactions that are not collateralised
at the outset but becomes so following a particular
event, rather than transactions collateralised from the
start whose collateral changes in relation to variations
in the market price of the instrument. This
mechanism does not result in a change in the initial
financing conditions but obligates the borrower to
pledge assets to guarantee its financing over time. The
impact on the borrower’s situation should therefore
mainly be analysed in terms of opportunity cost.
Adjusting the nominal interest rate
of current or future loans
Bonds and bank loans whose initial interest rates or
coupons are revisable in the event of a change in
the borrower’s rating or some of its financial ratios,
have increased over the past few years, particularly
in the TMT sectors. As regards bank loans, clauses
are likely to apply to both credit lines that are
confirmed and already drawn and those that are
collateralised but yet to be drawn. These clauses are
generally referred to as step-up clauses.106 FSR • The development of contingency clauses • November 2002
Bonds carrying step-up coupons have a
pre-established coupon that is likely to be
incremented in the event of the issuer’s rating being
downgraded, in accordance with the following
pre-specified conditions: if the rating is downgraded
to beyond a certain threshold, in the following years
the coupon rate will be incremented by a fraction
agreed at the outset. In general, if the company’s
situation improves and it recovers its initial rating,
the coupon rate is likely to return to its issue level.
However, it will not fall below this level even if the
rating is upgraded to above its initial level. The actual
conditions for triggering step-up clauses may vary
on a company-to-company basis.
The table below shows how the impact of a ratings
downgrade differs according to whether or not the
bond carries a step-up clause, i.e. in the case of two
identical bonds with a maturity of five years and a
5.5% coupon initially yielding 6.5%, one being
standard and the other carrying a step-up clause 3.
Let us assume that a non-factored in downgrade,
which results in a 25-basis point increment in the
yield to 6.75%, leads to a 1 percentage point discount
from 95.8% to 94.8%. The price of a bond with
Different conditions for triggering step-up coupons
Examples from the European Telecom sector
While the principle of step-up bonds is identical for all issuers, issues are governed by specific conditions that
often result in very varying prices on the secondary market. The most significant conditions for ratings-related
step-up clauses are:
– Triggering the step-up clause. The terms and conditions for taking into account a ratings downgrade vary
among companies. In the case of certain bonds, the clause is only triggered when the rating is downgraded
by several credit rating agencies – i.e. Deutsche Telekom step-up bonds whose clause is triggered by a
simultaneous downgrade by Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s – while for others, a downgrade by a single
rating agency suffices (see various France Télécom and KPN issues).
– Application of the step-up clause. In general, a downgrade during a given year will not affect the following
coupon, but that of the coupon paid the year after. Such is the case for France Télécom and Deutsche
Telekom bonds. However, for some bonds (KPN – 2003), the coupon is modified at the same time as the
rating is downgraded, so that the amount of the coupon paid on the following anniversary date will be
calculated in proportion to the initial coupon and the new coupon.
– The amount of the step-up. The coupon may be incremented each time the rating is downgraded – i.e.
France Télécom and KPN (2006) bonds whose coupons are incremented by 25 basis points and 37.5 basis
points respectively each time the rating is downgraded below a pre-defined level (A–/A3 for France Télécom
and BBB+/Baa1 for KPN) — or just once, with a more significant increment in the coupon rate (see, for
example, Deutsche Telekom issues whose coupons increase by 50 basis points if the rating is downgraded
to below BBB+/A3).
3 For the sake of simplicity, we shall consider that the premium linked to the step-up coupon is zero provided that the market is not factoring in a
change in the issuer’s rating.
similar characteristics but with an embedded
step-up clause will always decline less, but the rise
in the coupon will partially or fully offset, or even
exceed, the initial downward impact on the bond’s
price, depending on the agreed coupon increment.
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The price of step-up bonds follows a similar pattern
to that of standard fixed-rate bonds, if the clause is
not triggered, and to that of variable or floating rate
bonds if the clause is triggered or expected to be
triggered. Contrary to agreements that require
collateral to be posted if the rating is lowered, the
issuer/borrower does not incur the simple
opportunity cost associated with the triggering of the
clause, but a sometimes immediate mechanical
increase in the cost of financing.
Casting doubts on the financing itself
Based on the principle of puttable bonds, acceleration
and termination clauses were developed, which, when
activated, result in, for a loan initially granted for a
long period, the acceleration and termination of credit
availability. Once again, these types of clauses are
used in bond contracts and bank loan agreements, as
well as in back-up credit lines. The effect of these
clauses being triggered may be devastating, as it may
instantly cut off access to the financing.
2|1 Specific price dynamics
The sharp increase in debt instruments with options
complicates matters greatly for investors, who must
be able to assess the risks well enough to accurately
measure their exposure and carefully compare these
instruments’ yields with those of standard bonds.
The difficulty consists in calculating the price of
the option, by separating it from the “naked”
security, as well as in estimating the probability of
the option being exercised. While the value of a bond
with an embedded option is equivalent to the value
of a “standard” bond plus/minus the value of the
option, the valuation methods for each given
instrument vary according to the nature of the
embedded option.
– In  the case of a puttable bond, the investor
purchases an option to sell (put option) the bond.
The price of the bond will therefore be higher
and its yield lower than that of a standard plain
vanilla bond with the same maturity and same
coupon. The value of a puttable bond is therefore
equal to the price of a standard bond plus the
premium relating to the put option. In the event
of a sharp fall in the yield, the option, which will
be considerably out-of-the-money, will only have
a very low value as the price of the bond will be
much higher than the strike price. As the expiry
date approaches, the value of the option will
decrease. Close to expiry, the option, which only
has a very remote chance of being exercised, will
no longer have any value. In both these cases,
the price of a puttable bond is almost the same as
that of a standard bond.
– However, as regards callable bonds, as the
investor is the seller of the option, the price is
lower and the yield is higher than that of a
standard bond with an identical maturity and
coupon. The price of a callable bond is therefore
equivalent to that of a “standard” bond minus
the value of the option.
– If the bond carries a step-up clause, when the
clause is triggered, the investor will see an
increment in the coupon of the initial bond. This
situation is close to that of an investor who
simultaneously holds a puttable bond with the
issuer and a call option on a new bond with the
same maturity as the initial bond but paying
higher coupons. The price of the step-up bond is
therefore equal to the price of a standard bond
plus the value of the premium relating to this
particular option.
2|2 The ineffectiveness
of traditional valuation tools
Owing to the hybrid nature of bonds with embedded
options, it is not possible to employ the methods used
for valuing plain vanilla bonds. Indeed, in order to
calculate the present value of a fixed-income security
it would be necessary to know the periodic cash
flows. For bonds with option clauses, this is not
possible, as the amount of the periodic coupon
payments —  in the case of bonds with step-up
clauses — or the life of the bond — in the case of
callable or puttable bonds — could be modified to
reflect the changes in the issuer’s situation.
2| The complexity of valuing financing instruments
with contingency clauses108 FSR • The development of contingency clauses • November 2002
– The usual method for calculating yield-to-
maturity is ineffective and cannot be used to
obtain an indicator of a relevant yield that can be
compared with a yield on a risk-free bond to
obtain a spread reflecting the credit risk of the
instrument in question.
– The same applies to the yield obtained from
scenarios corresponding to a yield-to-worst
analysis (the worst possible performance on the
basis of current market conditions). This method
does at least take into account the option
embedded in the bond, but it does not address
the problem relating to the uncertain pattern of
its future cash flows. Furthermore, this indicator
may be highly volatile, given that a change in the
bond’s market price may result in a change in
the worst repayment date for the investor,
significantly modifying all the previous estimates.
– Calculating the yield using a yield-to-first-call/put
approach (assuming the option will be exercised
on the soonest possible date) appears more
prudent, but, as above, it does not provide a





We shall now focus on valuation methods for bonds
with step-up clauses. These methods differ from
those which may be applied to callable or puttable
bonds in that, the event triggering the option, and
in particular the consequences of the clause being
triggered, are not identical.
As step-up bonds cannot be valued in the same way
as standard bonds, in order to analyse them it is
necessary to measure the value of the step-up clause
based on the market value. At the same time, it is
possible to estimate the clause’s theoretical value by
adjusting the coupon along with the probable trend
in the company’s rating. By comparing the two
measurements, it is possible to obtain an indication
of market participants’ central scenario on the
company’s rating outlook over a given horizon.
Estimating the market value
of the step-up clause: an empirical approach
The market value of a bond with a step-up clause is
equal to the sum of the market value of an equivalent
“standard” bond plus the step-up premium. The value
of this premium, also known as the step-up spread,
depends on market participants’ expectations
relating to the issuer’s rating outlook. This value can
be estimated by calculating the spread between the
market yield for the step-up bond and that of an
equivalent bond with the same maturity and same
issuer, but without a step-up clause.
The value of the step-up option is, however, difficult
to directly assess on the market. This is mainly due
to the fact that it is rare that the same issuer issues
both a standard bond and a step-up bond with the
same maturity. Therefore, in order to measure this
value, a certain number of estimates and adjustments
are necessary.
All things being equal, if it is expected that the issuer’s
rating will be downgraded, the value of the option
and, hence, the price of the bond, will increase.
Therefore, the higher the expectations of a downgrade,
the more negative the step-up spread will become.
Once the step-up clause has been triggered, provided
that no further downgrades are expected, the option
loses value and the step-up spread generally becomes
zero. However, if an upgrade has been factored in,
the value of the option becomes negative and the
step-up spread becomes positive, provided that there
is a step-down clause as well as a step-up clause
(based on the coupon increment valuation method) 4.
The possible variations in the yield of a step-up bond
can be illustrated by the KPN June 2003 bond. Until
September 2001, the date on which it was announced
that the company’s rating had been downgraded, this
bond was trading at a slight premium vis-à-vis the
equivalent plain vanilla bond. It had a negative
step-up spread, indicating that this downgrade had
been factored in. Subsequently, the bond’s yield
fluctuated around the interpolated curve along with
changes in market participants’ rating expectations.
In October 2001, the step-up spread became very
negative, pointing to expectations, at the time, of
further downgrades before June 2002, the date on
which the coupon becomes payable.
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Methodology and practical difficulties in estimating
the market value of a step-up option
Estimating the yield of a bond with the same maturity as that of the step-up bond
When there are a large number of issues with closely-grouped maturities, the linear interpolation between the
yields of the two “standard” bonds with the closest maturities on either side of the step-up bond in question
may be satisfactory, provided that the liquidity of the bonds are the same 1. However, this measurement does
not take into account the concavity of the yield curve 2. If the number of issues is limited or if the difference in
maturity between the bonds is too great, it may be necessary to use a yield curve calculated on the basis of
issues with the same rating and, if possible, in the same sector of activity.
Calculating the yield of the step-up bond
The yield of a step-up bond can be calculated in two ways: either based on the initial level of the coupon, i.e.
the current value of the step-up spread, taking into account any actual coupon increments, which can only be
positive or zero. Or, based on the coupon increments, i.e. the present value of the step-up spread can then be
positive or negative depending on whether the market is factoring in a further downgrade or an improvement
in the company’s rating. While the first method enables greater continuity of the analysis over time, the
second may be better suited to a forward-looking approach. Both methods should, however, produce the same
conclusions as to how investors’ expectations are likely to change.
Estimating the value of the step-up coupon
This estimate can be made by calculating the difference between the yield interpolated from the benchmark
curve and the market yield of the step-up bond, i.e. the difference between the step-up bond’s yield and the
benchmark yield. A curve can then be plotted replicating the step-up spread throughout the life of the bond.
Estimating the step-up option for a given concavity of the yield curve
1 If the amount outstanding of the step-up bonds is significantly greater than that of the standard bonds used for the interpolation, the
step-up spread, provided that it takes account of the liquidity premium, may overestimate expectations of ratings downgrades, or
under-estimate expectations of an upgrade.
2 The fact that the concavity of the yield curve is not taken into account tends to minimise the level of the benchmark yield, and consequently
diminish the impact of the expectations of ratings downgrades. The more distant the maturities of the closest standard bonds to the step-up
bond are, the more this will be the case. The opposite will be true if benchmark yields are estimated by extrapolation.
By interpolation of the benchmark yield By extrapolation of the benchmark yield
Step-up bond yield
Real “normal” equivalent yield Yield curve
Interpolated “normal” equivalent yield
Extrapolated “normal” equivalent yield
Under-estimated step-up spread
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Estmating the theoretical value
of a step-up coupon: probabilities
of ratings downgrades
The present value of a step-up coupon is
calculated by discounting the remaining coupons,
with the amount of these flows being determined
by whether or not the step-up clauses are
triggered. Where P is the probability of a step-up
coupon being triggered for year t, and Z is the
zero coupon rate corresponding to the risk of the
issuer in question. The calculation is expressed
as follows:




Pt x step-up coupons t
(1 + Z t )t
In order to estimate the theoretical value of a
step-up spread, it is therefore necessary to assess
the probabilities of the issuer’s rating being
downgraded over the life of the bond in question.
By using transition matrices constructed by
international rating agencies, we can obtain the
likely general scenarios. In effect, these matrices
give the probability of a given rating of an issuer
or a bond changing within a given time horizon.
For example, by making a one year projection of
a transition matrix, we obtain the probabilities of
the rating being changed for the following years.
Within this theoretical valuation framework, in order
to make a detailed analysis of the expectations
regarding a given issuer, the general scenarios derived
from the transition matrices must be replaced by
rating outlook scenarios taking into account the
specific characteristics of the company and its debt.
These scenarios, and the associated levels of step-up
spread can then be compared with the level of price
of the step-up coupon on the market. In effect, the
general calculation formula can be used to obtain a
“likely” scenario of the issuer rating outlook from the
price of the step-up coupon observed on the market.
The chart below shows how the yield of a step-up bond varies




At the time of issue, the step-up is on or  
below the issuing company’s yield curve
(On the basis of the rating outlook)
When ratings downgrades are expected, 
the step-up spread widens
After the downgrade, the step-up bond 
is generally on the curve
When rating upgrades are expected, 
once the step-up clause has been triggered, 
the spread becomes positive (step-down)
(Estimate of the step-up bond based  
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Yield of the KPN June 2003 and estimate of the associated step-up spread
Yield as a % Spread in basis points
Sources: Bloomberg, Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, Banque de France
Estimate of the theoretical value of the step-up bond based on scenarios
derived from rating agencies’ transition matrices
For a two-year bond, carrying a 25-basis point step-up clause, triggered on each downgrade between A– and
BBB–, and a 75 basis point fixed increment below that rating, the Markovian probability of a downgrade
should be assessed for each year. The calculation using a Standard and Poor’s one-year transition matrix
gives the following probabilities of a downgrade in the first year: 7.1% (A– to BBB+), 2.6% (A– to BBB) and
1.7% (A– to BBB– or below). And for the second year, the following probabilities are obtained: 11.1%, 4.7%
and 3.3%. On the basis of a 3% and 4% zero coupon bond, at one and two years respectively, the present
value of the step-up will be:
Discounted value=[((7.1% x 0.0025) + (2.6% x 0.005) + (1.7% x 0.0075)) / 1.03] + [((11.1% x 0.0025) +





















Value of the step-up (right scale)
Step-up bond (left scale)
Extrapolated yield (left scale)
« Rating Actions » : Moody’s : Baa2 (negative outlook)
« Rating Actions » : Moody’s : Baa3 (negative outlook)
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The inclusion of contingency clauses in bond
contracts and bank loan agreements is logical from
the lender’s point of view, as it limits individual
exposure to a given issuer or category of issuers. It
is also justifiable from the borrower’s point of view,
as it limits the immediate cost of external financing
and diversifies the sources of financing.
However, the development of these types of clauses
in recent years, as well as the diversification of their
terms and conditions of exercise, have raised a
number of questions regarding their effects on both
market participants and the actual dynamics of the
financial markets.
The use of contingency clauses raises three main
issues that are worth exploring.
3|1 Marked pro-cyclicality
Contingency clauses enable borrowers
to instantly increase their leverage margins...
When companies experience periods of heavy
borrowing, their cost of borrowing tends to rise along
with the increase in their debt level and, accordingly,
the level of risk. This rise in the cost of borrowing
then acts as a disincentive, helping to limit further
increases in companies’ debt level. However, this
self-regulating mechanism may be undermined by
the development of contingency clauses, which make
it possible to cap the immediate cost of borrowing,
or limit its increase. They may therefore encourage
companies to become more indebted. Indeed, the use
of these types of clauses has developed most
systematically among companies in the TMT sectors,
that is to say in the sectors that have had the greatest
borrowing requirements over the past few years.
... at the risk of weakening
their financial structures...
This additional short-term flexibility, reflecting a more
general easing of the liquidity constraints arising from
financial innovation, may, however, very rapidly
become costly in the event of a turnaround in the
economic environment or if the issuer encounters
3| Contingency clause dynamics: a critical analysis
in terms of financial stability
particular difficulties. Indeed, the use of contingency
clauses makes the issuer more sensitive to any
deterioration in the environment or in its own
situation, which could increase the risk of these
clauses being triggered, and could in turn worsen the
issuer’s financial structure by further increasing the
cost of borrowing, or even cutting off access to
financing. Therefore, a company whose debt contains
such clauses and which is not properly prepared for
this situation, could lose control over its liquidity
situation if these clauses are triggered. This could in
turn rapidly affect its solvency. The tripping of a rating
trigger may in itself become a credit event, and
liquidity a major determining factor in credit risk.
... and at the risk of causing
a dangerous spiral
The triggering of contingency clauses may mean that
a difficult situation could turn a liquidity crisis into
a solvency crisis, generating an irreversible
downward spiral for a company or a group. These
clauses may result in a negative gearing effect for
the company.
The following sequence, based on the experience of
the Californian group Pacific Gas and Electric
Corporation at the start of 2001, illustrates this chain
of events 5:
– in January 2001, the rating of the holding
company and that of its subsidiary PGE Company
were downgraded to below investment grade;
– the credit facilities initially extended to PGE
Company were terminated, following the ratings
downgrade that constituted an event of default
under the facilities that contained ratings triggers;
– there was an immediate demand by the
counterparties of PGE Company for additional
collateral to be put forward, in the event of the
holding company’s rating being downgraded;
– as a result of the ratings downgrades it became
impossible for PGE Company and PGE
Corporation to access the commercial paper (CP)
market and consequently they could not honour
payments on maturing CP;
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– this default on CP triggered demands for
redemption of the company’s medium-term notes
(acceleration clauses);
– moreover, following the downgrade, PGE
Company was asked to collateralise its activity
on the energy market (California Power
Exchange). Since the company was unable to post
such collateral, it could not continue its usual
trading activities;
– PGE Company filed Chapter 11 in April 2001.
3|2 A situation that complicates
the assessment of a company’s
financial soundness
The presence of contingency clauses in the liabilities
of a company’s balance sheet makes it far more
complicated for investors and analysts to assess its
financial situation. It also complicates the task for
rating agencies.
Growing asymmetry of information
The situation prevailing on the financial markets
over the past few months has shown that many
investors only had partial, or even extremely
fragmented knowledge of companies’ financial
structures. This contributed to the volatility on credit
and stock markets, and added to the confidence crisis
that markets are currently experiencing. It appears
that it is difficult or even impossible for investors to
obtain information for detecting the possible
existence of contingency clauses in companies’ debt
structures.
– When these clauses are embedded in bond
contracts, where the information is public and
should be available, it is up to investors — also in
the case of shares — to carry out detailed analyses
in order to take these clauses into account in their
investment decisions. But, even after detecting
these clauses, investors still require the
wherewithal to be able to assess their potential
impact.
– When these clauses are incorporated in bank loan
agreements, they are, at present, rarely disclosed
to the public or known to the community of
market participants 6. This situation is liable to
amplify the asymmetry of information and
endanger the smooth operation of the markets
by skewing the asset price formation mechanism.
The impact of a contingency clause being
triggered will be more severe if it is not
anticipated or priced in.
Until recently, that is to say until the triggering of
such clauses contributed to the spectacular plunge
in the price of major stocks, it seems that equity
markets had only vaguely acknowledged their
existence. However, these instruments transfer part
of the risk from the credit market to the shareholders.
Above and beyond the lack of transparency regarding
the use of these products, the appeal of equity
markets in the latter half of the 1990s is very likely
to have contributed to this phenomenon of collective
short-sightedness.
The necessary development
of the rating process
The increasing use of contingency clauses has
naturally affected the rating process of credit rating
agencies:
– Like the community of market participants, rating
agencies are faced with the problem of obtaining
exhaustive information. However, for the latter
it is even more important to be able to access this
information as these agencies are at the very core
of the process of assessing credit quality and their
“verdicts” play a vital role in financial market
dynamics. As far as this last point is concerned,
we should bear in mind the “threshold effects”
arising from an issuer being downgraded to below
the investment grade category. Such a prospect
is likely to lead to a drop in the price of the bond
as it is massively sold over a short period of time.
– The contingency clauses examined above may be
triggered by both exogenous factors, such as the
rating, and by endogenous factors, such as
changes in the price of the bond on the secondary
6 The IAS accounting standards, in particular IAS 32, call for a detailed description of the characteristics of the financial instruments used by
companies, regardless of whether they are booked in the balance sheet. Notably, they require information on the terms and conditions of early
redemption, the use of collateral, and any particular clauses attached to these instruments. The US GAAP accounting standards, i.e. FAS 105, also
call for detailed disclosure by companies of the characteristics of financial instruments used.114 FSR • The development of contingency clauses • November 2002
market, or changes in some of the issuer’s
financial ratios. Experience shows that
interactions between the different factors — a
ratings downgrade, even if no rating-related
triggers are attached, may contribute to a rapid
worsening of the company’s financial ratios,
which could trigger certain clauses; conversely
an, even limited, deterioration in these financial
ratios could generate a ratings downgrade, which
will in turn trigger such clauses —  are very likely
to cause financial shocks, or even a dangerous
downward spiral for the issuer.
Contingency clauses are likely to have a number of
different effects on credit agencies rating assessment
processes:
– As part of this process, by rigorously examining
the company’s weaknesses, it is assumed that the
company’s capacity to resist the simultaneous
triggering of all of its clauses is tested. In doing
so, the rating process may result in an excessive
focus on short-term considerations, whether they
be technical or market-related, rather than on
medium or long-term factors. This may be
particularly the case when an issuer’s debt
contains a number of contingency clauses, with
some linked to its rating, and others to changes
in its financial ratios or its market price.
– While placing greater importance on short-term
considerations, the use of contingency clauses
justifies increased vigilance on the part of rating
agencies. All other things being equal, this may
result in increased instability of ratings as well as
in the two-fold impact of a decline in the average
level of ratings — as contingency clauses are now
exhaustively taken into account without fully
understanding the extent to which they are used
or their effects — and a broader spread of ratings
throughout the whole scale. These effects have
an impact on the behaviour of fund managers.
Given the extremely rigorous asset allocation rules
to which fund managers are subject, the above-
mentioned threshold effects become amplified.
– The increasing use of ratings-related contingency
clauses is likely to multiply and complicate the
sensitive situations that rating agencies face
when making assessments — hesitation over
downgrading a company’s rating due to the
definitive nature of such an action — in view of
the fact that the impact of their decisions could
be hugely amplified.
In this context, there is a danger that rating process
as it stands may become a “risk factor” and a source
of volatility in the asset price formation mechanism,
more than an instrument for measuring relative risks.
3|3 A false sense of protection?
While it is rational for an investor or a bank creditor
to try to control its risk/reward trade-off through
contingency clauses, the widespread use of these
practices may result in the opposite effects to those
initially sought. This will be even more the case if
market participants lack exhaustive and reliable
information about the extent to which and way in
which issuers/borrowers use these types of clauses:
– Systematic use of these types of clauses is likely
to strip the protection sought of any real
substance, lulling individual lenders into a false
sense of security.
– This false security might encourage the various
categories of creditors to be less rigorous in their
risk assessment process and when extending new
credits, while greater vigilance should be called
for. While creditors have the possibility, or believe
that they have the possibility, of very rapidly
adjusting their level of exposure, they may cease
to be sufficiently rigorous in their financing or
investment decisions. A similar problem is
encountered when examining the possible effects
of the explosion in credit derivatives, as
contingency clauses can in fact be considered to
be instruments for transferring credit risk.
– These clauses, which make ratings less stable and
make companies more sensitive to their
short-term environment, expose financial
markets to higher levels of volatility. Lastly, on
average, they may lead to a widening of credit
spreads, and thus to an increase in the cost of
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Over the past few years there has been a real explosion in the use of contingency clauses, driven by
companies’ increasing borrowing requirements. One of the conclusions that we can draw from this
analysis is that these clause can have significant effects on the borrowers that use them and on the
overall functioning of financial markets. Owing to their possible knock-on effects and the excessive
focus on short-term factors in which they result, these clauses are liable to create the conditions for
their destabilising effects on financial markets to become self-perpetuating. It is therefore essential that
their use be subject to a high degree of transparency. It is indeed the lack of transparency, and the
consequent inability of market participants to correctly assess the impact of their being triggered on
the issuer’s situation, that may result in destabilising dynamics. This transparency requirement should
be more closely observed by all market participants as knowledge of these instruments improves.
Nevertheless, even with greater transparency and more ample information, companies should use
these instruments with caution, and rating agencies, analysts and investors should carry out detailed
analyses of their potential effects.